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26 June 1979

2. Background: My staff has been investigating intelligence support currently provided to operating forces to seek ways to improve the NFIP contribution. The work is divided into three parts: Strategic Forces, Army and Tactical Air Support, and Navy Operating Forces. 25% a. The Navy segment is forwarded separately in draft form for two reasons: The Navy team has identified additional work that should be completed in-house over the summer to support (or contradict) assertions made in the draft. This version, then, is intended to be a status report rather than a finished product. The tentative conclusions are counter-intuitive, hence potentially controversial. We solicit your concurrence before proceeding further. b. The focus of analysis was on the needs of operating forces, but the thrust of conclusions is directed toward intelligence functions which provide warning to the NCA rather than to operating forces directly. In the transition from peace to war for sea control with the Soviets, NCA decisions based on warning could be the most vital form of support to operating forces. In particular, decisions to redeploy forces away from areas where preemptive strike is probable and/or to modify rules of engagement, could give the Battle Group Commander an execution advantage he does not now enjoy. The current focus of intelligence support is on tactical	MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence	
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25X1	3. Staff Position: The unanimous support of all those with a stake in intelligence support to operating forces is not a feasible objective, but it appears appropriate to learn more before inviting formal comment. Thus far, the informal working relationships established with key Navy offices have provided free and candid exchanges and an invitation to continue the work.	
	4. Recommendation: It is recommended that we pursue the investigations further before developing a finished product (target date of September). If you concur, my staff will focus on the I&W function to learn whether the basis exists, or could be developed, in I&W for appropriate NCA decisions in support of Navy forces. Formal staffing would be held in abeyance pending completion of work.	25X1
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	Attachment: Intelligence Support to Navy Operating Forces (DRAFT)	
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CONCUR: Director of Central Intelligence	Date
NON-CONCUR: Director of Central Intelligence	Date

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NAVY OPERATING FORCES

DRAFT FOR COMMENT

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